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INTRODUCTION
WHAT OUGHT TO BE DONE-WHAT CAN BE
DONE-WHEN THE WRONG PERSON IS IN
JAIL OR ABOUT TO BE EXECUTED? AN
INVITATION TO A MULTI-DISCIPLINED
INQUIRY, AND A DETOUR ABOUT LAW
SCHOOL PEDAGOGY
W. William Hodes*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the Symposium that follows these introductory comments, the
editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review have assembled an
impressive company of thinkers to wrestle with a variation on a well-
known hypothetical: What ought a lawyer, a clergyman, and a
psychotherapist do when confronted with the knowledge that a
stranger is about to be executed for a crime committed by a person
with whom each has a professional relationship? In addition to
introducing the participants and the problem, I want to argue that
what ought to be done cannot be considered in the abstract and in
isolation, but instead must be considered in context, in conjunction
* Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
Professor William Hodes is an honors graduate of Harvard College (1966) and
Rutgers Law School in Newark, New Jersey (1969). He is the co-author (with Geoffrey
C. Hazard, Jr.) of The Law of Lawyering (2d ed. 1990), a treatise on the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct that is updated annually. He lectures frequently at bar association
and continuing legal education functions and has served as a consultant or expert witness
in a number of cases involving legal ethics issues. In 1993, Professor Hodes served as a
consultant to a W. M. Keck Foundation project that produced two professionally acted
videotapes for use in professional responsibility courses in American law schools.
In the 1996-97 school year, Professor Hodes will take a year off to serve as law clerk
to Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who was one of his law professors during
her Rutger years.
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with what can be done.
The editors have asked the Symposium contributors to write
about but one of the three professions represented in the problem.
The Essays are grouped in the order suggested by the problem: Ben
Jones, the person who actually committed the crime, first "confesses"
to lawyer Claire Hopewell, then to religious counselor Paul Samuels,
and finally to psychotherapist Jennifer Palmer. A short biographical
sketch of each author is included in an introductory footnote in each
essay to help readers discern what insights and experiences each
author brings.to the discussion of one of the three fictional profession-
als.
Most of the contributors are law professors-lawyers-who
commonly teach legal ethics and professional responsibility courses.
They have all used similar classroom examples to underscore the
relationship between the legal, ethical, and moral components of a
lawyer's work Beyond this important similarity, however, the law
professor contributors collectively display a remarkable diversity of
backgrounds and approaches.
Although few have formal seminary training in religious doctrine
or practice, many were reared in a religious tradition and use their
faith to inform their writing about legal subjects-especially when the
legal subject is legal ethics. Others choose to exclude religious
concepts from the conversation, whether they personally are atheists
or believers. Similarly, while some of the law professor contributors
1. I do not use these three terms interchangeably, but find instead that keeping them
distinct is a significant aid to analysis. By "ethics," I mean the broad array of professional
norms that applies specifically to lawyers, acting as lawyers. Many of these norms derive
from tradition, peer pressure, and self-definition of what a professional, ethical lawyer
should or should not do. Other norms are legally binding, meaning that an infraction can
have "legal" consequences, such as disbarment, contempt of court, or disqualification from
a case, to say nothing of a malpractice suit. Lawyers are also subject to ordinary legal
commands, such as those appearing in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or those
involving crime, tort, contract, or tax.
By "morals," I mean norms that express judgments about whether conduct is right or
wrong, and the good or evil character of a person engaging in that conduct. One of the
most important debates within the law of lawyering asks whether action that is
unquestionably both legal and ethical-such as exploiting a "legal technicality" to secure
the acquittal of a factually guilty drug dealer-might not be immoral.
In this Essay the distinction between law, ethics, and morality is most clearly evident
in connection with the discussion of State v. Macumber. See infra part IV.C. Macumber
involved-or appeared to involve-tension between a legal rule of evidence (the attorney-
client privilege), an ethical rule (maintaining the confidences of a client), and the moral
imperative to do what is right (coming to the aid of another).
WHAT CAN BE DONE?
have formal education and advanced degrees in moral philosophy,
others have only limited "on-the-job training," or choose to strip their
analysis of such concerns, limiting themselves to the strictly "legal."
The law professors with broad experience in religion or psycholo-
gy were drafted to write about the nonlawyer actors in the drama. In
addition to this sprinkling of law professors, the second and third
groups of contributors consist of professionals who are themselves
active in the fields of religious counseling or psychotherapy. Some
have direct connections to the legal profession as well-such as
teaching law school classes or clinics, counseling lawyers and law
students, or appearing as expert witnesses or consultants in legal
proceedings. Beyond that, of course, all professionals in the United
States today are forced to deal at some level with lawyers and legal
concepts.
Clergymen are aware that the narrow and formalistic "priest-
penitent" privilege has broadened into a more general privilege that
applies whenever confidences are lodged with a spiritual adviser.2
Psychotherapists are conscious that the traditional, narrow doctor-
patient privilege for treating physicians has broadened into a privilege
that encompasses a wide range of counseling activities.3 At the same
time, these and other professionals cannot ignore the possibility that
giving advice that backfires, or wrongfully revealing confidential
material, may lead to malpractice liability.4
Accordingly, while the clergymen and psychotherapists who
contributed to the Symposium concentrate on how the traditions of
their professions inform the choices to be made by the corresponding
professional in the Symposium problem, they generally do not ignore
legal concerns altogether, because legal concerns have become a part
of those professional traditions.
II. TEACHING JUDGMENT THROUGH REAL CASE STUDIES AND
HYPOTHETICAL PROBLEMS
Despite periodic grumbling from within and without, and the
periodic proclamation of a need for grand-scale reforms, American
legal education has remained stubbornly committed to the case
2. JOHN H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §§ 2394-2396 (3d ed. 1940 & Supp. 1993).
3. Id. §§ 2380-2391.
4. See, e.g., Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425,551 P.2d 334, 131
Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
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method of teaching for over one hundred years.5 The content of
legal doctrine-what the law "is"-is in the main revealed to students
through deconstruction of a series of real-usually appellate-court
opinions. This holds even in areas of the law dominated by statutes
or codes, such as civil procedure, evidence, income taxation, or
commercial law, because in our common-law system, the gloss that the
cases put on those texts is itself a major component of "the law."
The deductive process of decoding the doctrinal messages locked
up in the cases also serves as a practical exercise in "learning by
doing" because the analytic skill thus honed mirrors what practicing
lawyers actually do when they read cases and other legal texts.
Although arguing from precedent is hardly a mechanical process that
yields a uniform result as dependably as a computer program, the call
of precedent is sufficiently strong to provide both a starting point and
some boundary lines for lawyerlike advocacy.6 Indeed, argumenta-
5. Keying in the words "case method" on my library's LegalTrac CD-ROM, I
generated a list of 65 titles-not all of which, concededly, were on point. A representative
exchange was led off by Paul Carrington, Haill Langdell!, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 691
(1995), separating Harvard Law Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell's somewhat silly
notions of "scientific" legal reasoning from his more important and more lasting
contribution of introducing the case method.
Professor Carrington received several responses: Laura Kalman, To Hell with
Langdelll, 20 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 771 (1995); William P. LaPiana, Honor Langdell, 20
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 761 (1995); John H. Schlegel, Damn! Langdell, 20 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 765 (1995).
The so-called McCrate Report, urging law schools to pay more attention to the
development of lawyering skills and professional values, is at bottom an attack on the case
method, or at least on too heavy a reliance on it. American Bar Ass'n, Task Force on
Law Schools and the Profession: Narrowing the Gap, Legal Education and Professional
Development-an Educational Continuum, 1992 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION
TO THE BAR 1. The McCrate Report has also generated a substantial amount of literature.
In many ways, the 1992 McCrate Report was prefigured by the 1979 Cramton Report.
American Bar Ass'n, Report and Recommendations of the Task Force on Lawyer
Competency: The Role of the Law Schools, 1979 A.B.A. SEC. LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSION
TO THE BAR 1.
6. To be sure, some scholars of the Critical Legal Studies school have claimed that
common law is "radically indeterminate" and provides no check on the unfettered
discretion of elite judges to rule as they please. In this view, studying lines of cases has
little practical value because there is always another line of cases available to support any
contrary position, and if no precedent is available, the judge will create one on the spot.
This, however, radically overstates the level of indeterminacy present in the system.
As noted immediately below in the text, there are boundaries to legitimate disputation,
commonly described in both legal ethics and civil procedure as the line separating the
"frivolous" from the "nonfrivolous." Professor Sanford Levinson, an important voice of
Critical Legal Studies, noted the connection in his article entitled Frivolous Cases: Do
Lawyers Really Know Anything at All?, 24 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 353 (1986). Professor
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tion that openly disdains the accepted tradition of dealing with
precedent in good faith is by definition out of bounds and not
lawyerlike. It is frivolous argumentation, and lawyers engaging in it
are subject to both professional censure and the imposition of
sanctions in connection with ongoing litigation.7
Recently, Anthony Kronman has argued in his elegant book, The
Lost Lawyer,' that using common-law cases as the primary teaching
materials in American law schools serves a related but more far-
reaching purpose.9 Forced to confront and to evaluate a series of
choices that others, especially appellate judges, have made in concrete
situations, law students develop not only knowledge and the intellec-
tual skill of reasoned analysis, but also the character trait and habit
of good judgment, or what Kronman also calls "prudence," "wisdom,"
or "legal statesmanship."'" Furthermore, forced by the give-and-take
of classroom discussion to consider and even to advocate ideas that
they do not personally hold, students are taught detachment and
tolerance, and ultimately the ability to engage in sympathetic
discussions about ends, not just means."
Levinson concluded that frivolous, as opposed to extremely weak, legal argumentation
does exist, is not exceptionally difficult to recognize, and must exist if there is to be such
a thing as an accepted tradition of what "law" is. The category of frivolous arguments,
however, cannot be described without resort to "radical indeterminacy."
7. See, for example, Model Rule of Professional Conduct 3.1, which bars a lawyer
from bringing or defending cases, or asserting positions therein, "unless there is a basis for
doing so that is not frivolous, which includes a good faith argument for an extension,
modification or reversal of existing law." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
Rule 3.1 (1983).
In civil litigation, the most recent version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11
requires lawyers to certify-upon pain of sanctions-that factual matters asserted in their
pleadings "have evidentiary support," and that legal contentions are "warranted by existing
law," or by "nonfrivolous argument" that seeks to distinguish or overturn existing law.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Under some circumstances, the offending lawyer's client may be
sanctioned as well. Id. Earlier versions of Rule 11, and many state rules modelled after
it, contain prohibitions of a similar kind.
8. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993).
9. Id. at 109-12.
10. id.
11. A shocking example of students who failed to learn these lessons is recounted by
Professor Deborah Rhode in chapter 11 of her brilliant text, PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILI-
TY-ETHICS BY THE PERVASIVE METHOD (1994). The controversy arose when the
problem was announced for the 1990 Marden Moot Court Competition at New York
University Law School. lt at 496. It involved a fictional matrimonial dispute in which
a divorcing father sought to deny the mother custody of the couple's child on the ground
that her lesbianism made her an unfit parent. Id.
After some students refused to participate in arguing the father's position, the student
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If Dean Kronman is right-at least about this aspect of the case
method of teaching law-then the case method ought to be especially
appropriate for teaching the deeper reaches of the law of lawyering.
In the view of many lawyers and scholars-including those who
disagree on many particulars of that branch of the law-two key
attributes of "good" lawyers are precisely this ability to exercise sound
judgment and discretion in concrete, often complex and morally
ambiguous, situations, and the willingness to participate with clients
in genuine-which is to say nonmanipulative-"moral dialog" about
what the client "ought" to do. 2 Thus, while the task of imparting
moot court board withdrew the problem, stating that the father's position "was not an
open question" in a law school community that condemns antigay bias. Id. at 497. The
students thus demonstrated neither the courage to engage in intellectual debate, nor the
wisdom to countenance the possibility that others, including judges, might hold the
contrary view in good faith. The only "skill" they demonstrated was the exercise of raw
political power-a skill unlikely to be useful in the service of a real future client who might
happen to be a divorcing lesbian mother! See, e.g., Linda Gibson, Mom's a Lesbian.
Dad's a Killer. Judge: She's Unfit, NAT'L LJ., Feb. 12, 1996, at A9 (describing Ward v.
Ward, a case pending in the First District Court of Appeals of Florida, in which a divorced
father and his fourth wife were granted custody of his daughter from his second marriage
on the ground that the second wife was living with a female companion, despite the fact
that the father had murdered his first wife).
In defense of the protesting students, it may be said that the artificial posture of an
appellate moot court problem deprived them of the opportunity they would have had in
real life to either refuse to take the father's case, or to take his case but to engage in a
moral dialog with him about what ends he ought to seek, and only then by what means.
As described below in the text, however, a moral dialog is only a legitimate element of
lawyering if the dialog itself is genuine and nonmanipulative. It seems unlikely that the
students embroiled in the Marden controversy would be capable of lending a sympathet-
ic-even if critical and independent-ear to a client in the father's situation.
12. See, e.g., Jamie G. Heller, Legal Counseling in the Administrative State: How To
Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE L.J. 2503 (1994); Peter Margulies, "Who Are You to Tell
Me That?": Attorney-Client Deliberation Regarding Nonlegal Issues and the Interests of
Nonclients, 68 N.C. L. REV. 213 (1990). The concept of a "moral dialog" is perhaps most
clearly associated with Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice of Law as Moral Discourse, 55
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 231 (1979), and his later book, THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING
A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR THE INNOCENT (1981).
Model Rule of Professional Conduct 2.1 provides that lawyers shall exercise
independent professional judgment and render candid advice, but that in doing so, they
may make reference to moral, political, or other factors. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSION-
AL CONDUCT Rule 2.1 (1983). This is a significant endorsement of the principle that while
lawyers must serve their clients zealously and loyally, they are not required to do so as
moral zombies or automatons.
It is important to note, however, that my depiction of the moral dialog included the
conditions that it must be genuine and nonmanipulative. Some lawyers take the idea of
Rule 2.1 and run too far with it, inappropriately manipulating or bullying their clients into
doing what the lawyer thinks they ought to do, fancied up as what is presumed or claimed
to be in the client's best interest. A dialog, in other words, becomes a monologue, unless
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the actual content of the law of lawyering may or may not be well
served by the case method of teaching, inculcating the habits of
thought that underlie lawyering itself will be well served. 3
It is commonly said that what law students take from the cases,
beyond doctrine, is the "real" curriculum of American law
schools-learning to "think like a lawyer." But if Kronman is right,
that old saw must be modified to read "learning to think like an
appellate judge"-and this would hold not only for the traditional
first-year courses, but for legal ethics as well. This does little damage,
however, to the view that American legal education, while university-
based, is professional training of the highest order. As Dean
Kronman shows at some length, the ability to think like an appellate
judge is also an important professional skill for the practicing lawyer.
Not only must litigation and negotiation lawyers be able to predict for
clients what the judges will say-if it comes to that-as in the classic
legal realism of Holmes and Llewellyn, 4 but counsellors, advisors,
the lawyer is willing to "lose" the moral debate and accept the client's position as tenable.
In most situations, the lawyer will then still be able to make an independent judgment
about whether to serve, or to continue, to serve, the client.
13. Not everyone agrees that the case method is suitable for teaching the kind of
detachment that is a prerequisite for genuine moral dialog. In David Luban & Michael
Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31
(1995), the authors specifically reject any such implication of Anthony Kronman's The Lost
Lawyer, although they agree with Kronman that "good judgment" is the single most
important attribute and "stock in trade" of a good lawyer. Id. at 34.
In order to teach good judgment, however, Luban and Millemann prescribe very
heavy doses of clinical education and cite with approval many authorities claiming that a
clinical setting is the only setting in which the habit of sound moral judgment can be
taught. Id. at 64-66. The mechanism for inculcating the habits of thought that make up
good judgment is either learning by imitation or learning by trial and error. Id. at 65.
Neither method will have the desired result, however, unless the one being imitated or the
one pointing out the errors has sound judgment and is able to describe the judgment
process.
For this reason alone, Luban and Millemann's paean to clinical education must be
rated as deliberately overdone for effect. The authors implicitly concede as much by citing
the work of clinical instructors, especially Robert Condlin, who agonize over the possibility
that bad clinical teachers may model manipulative behavior and teach correspondingly bad
moral judgment to their students. Id. at 64 n.133. Indeed, in the Henry Drake case,
Drake v. State, 247 S.E.2d 57 (Ga. 1978), the lawyer who knew that the wrong man was
on death row and tried to prevent his release was a clinical instructor at the University of
Georgia School of Law. See discussion infra part IV.B.
14. Perhaps the most famous single statement of legal realism is from Oliver Wendell
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457,461 (1897) ("The prophecies of what
the courts will do in fact, and nothing more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.").
A "runner-up" statement is from KARL LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 12 (1951)
("What these officials [of the law] do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself.").
June 1996] 1553
1554 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:1547
and transaction lawyers must also think about the "justness" or
"rightness" of what they are doing in partnership with their clients, as
well as its social consequences.15 This is but a reprise of the earlier
point about moral dialog.
Although the case method has remained largely intact as the
basic teaching strategy in American law schools,16 the last twenty or
thirty years have seen a significant expansion of the raw materials
employed. Not only do law teachers continue to use classroom
hypotheticals to pose challenging variations to the actual cases, but
they have added more or less sophisticated "problem cases" to the
mix to test consistency of analysis and commitment to doctrine.
The use of problems in addition to litigated cases enriches the
classroom with a touch of realism. In the hands of the best teachers,
problems can so change the pedagogical dynamic of even a large class
that it suddenly resembles an intimate clinical practicum, or at least
the "rounds" that are integral to the process of medical education.
For one thing, the problems are often taken from real cases or real
transactions, and put students into realistic role playing situations that
capture the decision-making process that virtually always precedes
successful litigation or settlement, or the successful completion of a
business or financial transaction.
Much more important, however, is that the use of problems and
role plays can transform the classroom inquiry from a third person to
15. To be sure, Kronman has oversimplified somewhat in order to make his main
point. There are surely times (many times) when litigating lawyers (and trial judges, for
that matter) must make narrow technical decisions that are thoroughly cabined by existing
law that has been crafted by others.
16. This is not to deny that during the same period of time, legal education was
significantly enriched by the development of live-client clinical legal education on the
medical school model, as described by Luban and Millemann, supra note 13, and the vast
literature they invoke. Furthermore, clinicians helped classroom teachers develop
simulated role plays at every level of sophistication and complexity. It is still true,
however, that most legal education is delivered via some variation of the case method, and
that virtually all first-year courses are taught predominantly in that mode.
17. In "ward rounds" in particular, one student at a time "recites" the proper diagnosis
and care of a patient, but all of the students learn from that student's interaction with the
patient and with the teacher-physician.
The literature on the use of problems in law schools is extensive. See, e.g., Myron
Moskovitz, Beyond the Case Method: It's Time to Teach with Problems, 42 J. LEGAL
EDUc. 241 (1992). Of course, as I noted earlier, clinicians have made an enormous
contribution in developing problems and role plays for their own use and for use in
ordinary classroom settings. See supra note 16.
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a first person vantage point.8 Students no longer dissect what the
judge did or debate what the lawyer should do, nor even what they
themselves would do in a like situation; instead, they discuss with each
other what they will now do-in simulation, but in real time. Thus,
the true curriculum of the modem American law school continues to
be not merely "the law" simpliciter, but making judgments about the
law, in context.
III. THE SPECIAL CASE OF TEACHING ABOUT THE LAW OF
LAWYERING: JUDGMENT, DISCRETION, AND THE ROLE OF
"DOOMSDAY" SCENARIOS
During the same time frame-roughly the last twenty-plus
years-the teaching of what is variously described as "legal ethics,"
"professional responsibility," or "the law of lawyering" has experi-
enced a revolution of its own. Beginning as a curricular backwater,
often staffed by part-time teachers telling cynical war stories, or junior
faculty members dragooned by their deans to teach unfamiliar
material, this branch of the law has by now attracted a solid core of
career specialists, including some of the best and brightest scholars
and teachers in the academy.9 The literature about the subject
matter and the literature about the pedagogy have grown in quantum
leaps, both as to quantity and as to quality.
Since by its nature legal ethics focuses more attention on the
problems that lawyers face in their professional work than it does on
the substantive problems that lawyers help their clients solve, it is not
surprising to find that the shift from an exclusively third person
vantage point to a first person vantage point has proceeded at an
18. Ironically, it was David Luban who first brought this point to my attention, despite
his generally pessimistic view about the efficacy of most classroom teaching. See Luban
& Millemann, supra note 13. Professor Luban made his point about shifting from a third
person to a first person viewpoint in connection with the teaching of legal ethics
specifically, a subject I turn to below.
19. Even here there is disagreement. Luban and Millemann continue to be depressed
about the situation-indeed that is the impetus for their article, the genesis of their title
Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, and the reason they "gave up" on classroom teaching of
judgment about legal ethics. Luban & Millemann, supra note 13. On this issue, however,
I am quite confident that the authors have passed beyond ordinary scholarly exaggeration
into plain error! This conclusion is based on no scientific studies-just my own experience
talking and chatting on the Internet to dozens of committed scholars and teachers, and
reading as much as I can of their vast scholarly output, including quite a bit from David
Luban himself.
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accelerated pace.2' Legal ethics teachers often employ in-class
simulations and role plays, and in addition to textbook treatment,
several bibliographies of such materials are in circulation." Dozens
of film excerpts from documentary or fictional accounts of lawyers at
work are also commonly used, together with a rich library of
"vignettes," sometimes accompanied by expert commentary from a
panel of lawyers and judges'
20. One of the most widely used texts for teaching the law of lawyering is THOMAS
D. MORGAN & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (6th ed. 1995), originally published in 1976. Morgan and Rotunda
introduce each unit of material with a problem in the mold of the Symposium problem,
always including nuance and context, and often including realistic dialogue. Professor
Andrew L. Kaufman uses a similar format, except that the problems are much more
condensed, and he often utilizes a series of problems on the same topic to showcase
variations on a theme: ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSI-
BILITY (3d ed. 1989).
Problems of intermediate complexity are featured in N. CRYSTAL, PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY: PROBLEMS OF PRACTICE AND THE PROFESSION (1996) and RICHARD
A. ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, LEGAL ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (1995).
Professor Deborah Rhode's text on teaching legal ethics by the "pervasive method"
includes treatment of several substantive areas of the law in which ethical issues may arise,
much of it introduced through problems or case studies. The chapter on Constitutional
Law, for example, revolves around the Marden Moot Court controversy in which law
students refused to "represent" a father seeking to deprive his lesbian ex-wife of custody
of their child. RHODE, supra note 11.
21. In the Teachers Manual to ROY SIMON & MURRAY SCHWARTZ, LAWYERS AND
THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1994), Professor Simon provides detailed instructions and
background materials for a series of role plays and simulations that he advocates be used
throughout the course. Most of the role plays were developed by Professor Carrie
Menkel-Meadow in connection with earlier editions of the same text. In addition to
problems, numerous role plays are also built-in to CRYSTAL, supra note 20.
See also, Marsha Bird & Charles Sorenson, Selected Annotated Ethics Bibliography
(New England School of Law, 1995) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review);
Vanessa Merton, Basic Bibliography for Research in Legal Ethics and Professional
Responsibility, in STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW
AND ETHICS 853 (3d ed. 1992); Deborah L. Rhode, Annotated Bibliography of Teaching
Materials: Keck Center on Legal Ethics and the Legal Profession (Stan, Univ. Keck
Center) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
22. See ROGER CRAMTON, AUDIOVISUAL MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY (1988), for a somewhat dated bibliography published by the American
Bar Association, which includes descriptions and evaluation of materials ranging from
feature films to episodes of the television series L.A. Law. See also sources cited supra
note 21.
In STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS
(4th ed. 1995), the author has included several "scripts" of lawyers discussing ethical issues
in rich detail. Some of these scripts have been performed by professional actors, and the
resulting videotapes are available from New York University Law School under the title
Adventures in Legal Ethics.
Although at first blush it would seem that the use of film clips is a move backwards,
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By the same token, the legal ethics courses provide the perfect
laboratory in which to experiment with, and attempt to verify
Anthony Kronman's postulate in The Lost Lawyer that what makes
American legal education such a potent professionalizing experience
is its focus on prudence or judgment in varied contexts?3
Unfortunately, although this feature of the teaching of the law of
lawyering holds extra promise, it also creates an extra layer of
difficulty. The difficulty-which I call the "doomsday syn-
drome"-arises out of a pedagogical paradox that is common to much
of law school teaching, but its effect may be more pronounced in legal
ethics. In order to highlight areas where "judgment" is crucial, text
writers and teachers must often pick examples-whether real or
hypothetical-in which there is a marked contrast between the
available choices; in everyday life and in everyday practice, however,
much more uneventful judgments are typically the order of the day.
For example, important common-law rules of property or
contract may have evolved over a long series of cases with closely
balanced policy arguments on each side, and law students learn what
Dean Kronman calls "good judgment" by following in the footsteps
of common-law judges as they work through such problems and
triangulate to a relatively stable solution. In routine practice,
however, a lawyer does not reinvent these wheels, but demonstrates
his or her good judgment mainly by discerning where the develop-
ment of the rule has now come to rest, and guiding a client's actions
accordingly.
Examples of a descent from the dramatic to the commonplace
occur with greater regularity in legal ethics. On the one hand, legal
ethics-as presented to law students-is full of high drama and stark
choices, many of them involving clashes not only of policy, but of
fundamental moral values. Consider, for example, the famous
"Buried Bodies Case,"'24 in which the confidentiality principle clashed
towards third person passive learning, the most dramatic scenes often produce the opposite
effect in students. While nominally discussing the situations portrayed on the screen in the
third person, students approach the material with an intensity that betrays the fact that
they are substituting themselves into the story and thinking in the first person. The ability
to "hide" behind the fictional characters "liberates" them to talk about themselves. That,
at least, was the theory that I espoused in introducing the 1990 Annual Meeting program
of the Association of American Law Schools, Section on Professional Responsibility,
entitled "Problems, Role Plays, and Videotape."
23. KRONMAN, supra note 8, at 240-41.
24. People v. Beige, 372 N.Y.S.2d 798 (1975) (dismissing indictment of attorney for
failure to report the death of a person not known to medical authorities), aff'd, 359 N.E.2d
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with the desperate need of grieving parents to know whether their
daughter was alive or murdered, or at least where her body might be
found. In Spaulding v. Zimmerman' "zealous" lawyers attempting
to minimize a tort defendant's civil liability did not disclose to a
young plaintiff that his doctors had overlooked a life-threatening
aneurysm that the defense doctors had discovered. 6 Another
example is Commonwealth v. Stenhach,7 in which two young lawyers
defending a murder case found the murder weapon and claimed they
had a duty to withhold it from the government, when in fact the law
was well established that they instead had a duty to produce it without
awaiting a subpoena.28
On the other hand, however, a key lesson of modem legal ethics
scholarship is that the real bite of the law of lawyering lies in its
pervasive and "everyday" quality. It has often been noted that the
Model Rules of Professional Conduct have much more of the "feel"
of a positive law criminal cade than the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility it replaced, and that the Code in turn was more "code-
like" than earlier statements of professional tradition, including the
Canons of Professional Ethics.29 Nonetheless, discretionary language
still abounds in the Model Rules, recognizing-while at the same time
underscoring-the continuing need for judgment."
377 (N.Y. 1976). Virtually every law school text on professional responsibility contains
discussion of this case, often including excerpts from contemporary press accounts. The
account of one of the lawyers in the case is contained in TOM ALIBRANDI & FRANK
ARMANI, PRIVILEGED INFORMATION (1984).
25. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
26. Id. at 707. To be fair, it should be noted that neither the examining doctor nor
the defendant-who was personally close enough to the plaintiff to have given him a ride
in his car-disclosed the aneurysm either. Id.
It is possible, of course, that the defense lawyers never told the defendant about his
friend's situation, in the cynical belief that the defendant would "naturally" want to
maximize his chances in the lawsuit by withholding information that could hurt his case.
Although some might unthinkingly applaud this approach as "zealous advocacy," most
commentators today would regard it as a shocking betrayal of the client by preempting the
client's moral autonomy and depriving the client of the opportunity to "do the right thing."
27. 514 A.2d 114 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986), appeal denied, 534 A.2d 769 (Pa. 1987).
28. Id. at 119.
29. Professor Geoffrey Hazard, reporter to the commission that drafted the Model
Rules, has written extensively on this subject. Luban and Millemann comment thoroughly
on the process of "devolution" and "de-moralization," including Hazard's role in it. See
supra note 13; see also Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist
Jurisprudence in Legal Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1995) (discussing Hazard's work in
this area).
30. The discussion that follows immediately below in the text is based on GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD JR. & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON
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Lawyers may only charge such fees as are "reasonable,"'" for
example, but what is reasonable is a highly contestable proposition
that must in the first instance be judged by an interested party-the
lawyer setting the fee. Since the typical client will not know enough
to contest any but the most outrageous fees, the main enforcement
mechanism in this area of legal ethics is the quiet, day-to-day, self-
restraint of individual lawyers. Almost all of the rules regulating
conflicts of interest-even conflicts between lawyer and client-may
be waived by the client after the client has been "counseled" in the
matter. But the one doing the counseling will generally be the same
lawyer who has a financial interest in continuing the representation,
and the counseling will generally take place out of the public eye.
Whether the lawyer will subtly "shade" the explanation is not the
stuff of high drama, but it is at the very heart of legal ethics.
To take one more common example, the law of lawyering
imposes an enforceable duty upon lawyers to report the misconduct
of other lawyers-but only where the misconduct "raises a substantial
question as to that lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a
lawyer in other respects."32 Depending upon one's views about what
it means to be "fit" as a lawyer, one will have different views about
whether a particular misdeed casts "substantial" doubts on that score.
Furthermore, one's view may also be colored by other concerns, such
as a prior relationship with the lawyer in question, the interests of
clients who have dealt with the lawyer, the likelihood of repetition,
and so forth. Once again, the vast majority of "judgment calls" will
be made in private and not later subjected to public scrutiny.?
3
Thus, learning to debate extreme moral dilemmas may not, after
all, provide the best training for the series of small choices that arise
constantly in legal practice. As Professors Hazard, Koniak, and
Cramton note in their legal ethics text, while this kind of debate
THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT §§ 501-503 (2d ed. 1990 & Supp. 1996);
see also Reed Elizabeth Loder, Tighter Rules of Professional Conduct: Saltwater for
Thirst?, 1 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 311 (1987) (arguing that rules requiring specific behavior
in prepackaged rules will interfere with moral development); cf. William H. Simon, Ethical
Discretion in Lawyering, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988) (arguing that lawyers should
exercise judgment and discretion in an attempt to "do justice" rather than operate within
a system of formalized ethical rules).
31. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr Rule 1.5 (1991).
32. Il Rule 8.3(a) (emphasis added).
33. In In re Himmel 533 N.E.2d 790 (III. 1988), a lawyer was disciplined for failing to
report another lawyer's misconduct. The case caused a sensation in legal circles, precisely
because public airing of this problem is so rare.
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"illuminates the principle at stake, our commitment to it and our
compassion for the suffering of others, 3 4 it is also true that
by focusing our attention on the rare and exceptional,
[extreme examples] ... may train us to see moral choice
only when it is presented in stark terms, allowing us to
ignore the important lesson that in searching for an "ethical"
or "moral" course of action in more mundane situations the
choices are apparent only after a deeper examination of
context.
35
IV. THE "WRONG PERSON" DOOMSDAY SCENARIO: FACT,
FICTION, AND PEDAGOGICAL TOOL
There is a good answer to the point just borrowed from Profes-
sors Hazard, Koniak, and Cramton. Although the danger of myopia
does lie in too much focus on "doomsday scenarios," there is danger
of the opposite kind in ignoring them. Although rare or nonexistent
in the life of any particular lawyer, highly charged dilemmas present-
ing excruciating legal, ethical, and moral choices do arise with some
frequency within the profession as a whole. Robert Garrow really did
tell Frank Armani and Francis Beige where the bodies were buried.
Clients do offer to pay criminal defense lawyers in cash-cash that is
obviously the fruit of the very crime for which they are being
prosecuted. Lawyers do learn that a client is AIDS-infected and
deliberately not taking steps to protect a sex partner. Clients who
have jumped bail or fled the jurisdiction with a minor child have from
time-to-time left a forwarding address with their lawyers.
Indeed, on the very same page of the legal ethics text just
quoted, the authors discuss Robert Cover's brilliant and disturbing
book, Justice Accused,36 the highlight of which is an account of both
the public debate and the private anguish of the greatest nineteenth-
century Abolitionist lawyers and judges over whether it is better to
support the Constitution and work to change the immoral Fugitive
34. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING 323 (2d
ed. 1994).
35. Id. at 324-25 (emphasis added). Professor Roger Cramton made the same point
in opposition to abstract academic discussion in the American Law Institute of one of the
real cases, State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976), that is the basis for the
Symposium problem. See infra note 132 and accompanying text. Additionally, the
Symposium problem itself was deliberately enriched in order to provoke "tailored"
responses from the participants, rather than "one-size-fits-all."
36. ROBERT COVER, JusTIcE ACCUSED (1975).
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Slave laws passed under its authority, or to resist with civil disobedi-
ence and "frivolous" argumentation.37 Furthermore-still on the
same page-the authors note that there are even real cases in which
the "wrong man in jail" problem has been presented.38
The Symposium hypothetical, in other words, has been built on
a solid platform. Of all the "doomsday scenarios" commonly
discussed in law school classrooms, this one holds special fascination,
because it is so stark and so real.39 Below, I describe three real
versions of the story that have intrigued lawyers and law students over
the years. My purpose, however, is to blend in the substantive point
of this Introduction: that the specific context of each case-including
the Symposium problem-colors what can be done to alleviate the
tragedy, which affects what ought to be done. That focus should, in
turn, significantly affect the judgments we make in assessing what the
lawyers actually did do in any particular case.
Considering all three stories in quick succession also reveals a
feature that is common to contemporary death penalty jurisprudence
and to the matter of new trials generally-prosecutors, courts, and
other authorities manifest a truly remarkable steadfastness of purpose
in resisting any talk of newly discovered evidence, whether by
recantation or otherwise. This resistance is quite understandable, and
much of it is morally and ethically unobjectionable.4
In the vast majority of cases, prosecutors genuinely and in good
37. Id. at 175-91. Judge Lemuel Shaw of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
held the classic positivist view that even immoral laws and harsh results must be accepted
in order to sustain a rule of law that will produce more justice over the long run. Id. at
250. But he suffered deep personal anguish in living and judging according to this creed.
Id.
Professor Cover, noting that Shaw was the father-in-law of the novelist Herman
Melville, makes the plausible argument that the character of Captain Vere in Melville's
Billy Budd was patterned on the judge. Id. at 4. In the novel, Vere superintends the
legally proper but morally dubious conviction and execution of a naive seaman who has
killed a shipboard bully. Id
38. HAZARD ElT AL., supra note 34, at 324.
39. Although I will describe three real versions of this "doomsday scenario"
immediately below in the text, it should not be forgotten that many fictionalized versions
exist as well. An episode of the television series L.A. Law included such a storyline, and
of course the Symposium Problem was itself based on a role play featured in the Public
Broadcasting System series The Constitution-That Delicate Balance. See Symposium
Problem: The Wrong Man is About to Be Executed For a Crime He Did Not Commit, 29
LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1543, n.t (1996).
40. 1 am putting to one side, obviously, whether the death penalty itself is morally
supportable. The issue here is simply official resistance to anything that challenges the
finality of whatever result has been reached under existing law.
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faith believe in the guilt of persons that a jury has found guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.4' Last minute appeals to new evidence
often lack the ring of truth and seem most likely to have been
engineered by the convict himself as a desperate attempt to avoid a
date with the executioner. Judges at all levels generally take a similar
view, factoring in such additional concerns as a presumption of
regularity, the ease of fabrication, and the need for finality and
efficiency.
Of course, in the rare cases where the conviction has been
obtained by unethical means, or where a genuine mistake has been
made, the government has a different and less noble incentive to
resist reexamination-covering up the fact that it has expended public
resources to no end other than bringing an innocent man-or at least
a possibly innocent man-to death's door. The existence of such
cases, even though no doubt small in number, makes the courts'
reluctance even to entertain motions for new trials much less
attractive, even though the same arguments about the need for finality
are sound in the abstract.4
41. That much is hardly surprising. Noted defense attorney Alan Dershowitz has oftei
stated in writing and in his speeches that most persons actually put on trial are in fact
guilty. Indeed, in his book, ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, THE BEST DEFENSE (1982),
Dershowitz stated that most of his own clients had in fact been guilty, whether or not they
were convicted. Id. at xiv-v.
42. In Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), the Supreme Court denied federal
habeas corpus relief to a Texas convict who claimed no constitutional error in his original
conviction and death sentence, but claimed that newly discovered evidence would
demonstrate his "actual innocence." Ironically, for purposes of this Symposium, the
proffered evidence included affidavits by several people who claimed that a third
person-now deceased-had confessed to the killing for which Herrera had been
convicted. See the discussion of State v. Macumber, infra part IV.C.
Although the Court insisted that actual innocence is not itself a ground for relief, it
acknowledged that actual innocence is a "gateway" through which a petitioner may pass
in order to earn a hearing on constitutional claims that otherwise would have been barred
for technical reasons. Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404 (citing Sawyer v. Whitely, 505 U.S. 333
(1992)). Even with such a restrictive standard in play, the Herrera majority nonetheless
appeared to be stung by the dissenting Justices' charge that the Court would allow the
execution of an innocent person. 506 U.S. at 439 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Accordingly,
the Court pointedly noted that state authorities might still grant clemency, id. at 414, and
that even assuming that innocence itself was a cognizable claim, the claim of innocence in
Herrera was extraordinarily weak. Id. at 417.
Moreover, two of the Justices concurring in the majority opinion, O'Connor and
Kennedy, further hedged their support for it by reference to the weakness of the factual
proofs, id. at 420-24 (O'Connor, J., concurring), and Justice White concurred only in the
judgment because he was unwilling to go beyond that point for purposes disposing of the
case. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring).
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All of this means that especially when the awful truth that the
wrong person is in jail becomes known late in the proceedings, the
internal moral and ethical struggle described by the Symposium
authors is only part of a larger battle. The reality is that even if Ben
Jones can be persuaded to publicly confess his own responsibility for
the murder that Frank Smith will soon die for, or even if one of the
three professionals in the Symposium problem "blows the whistle" to
the prosecutor or to the press without Jones's consent, Frank Smith
will not soon be released.
To return to the implication of the title of this Introduction, it
appears that even when a professional faced with the difficulty posed
by the Symposium problem decides what he or she "ought" to do, he
or she may find it impossible to do it. But if what ought to be done
really cannot be done, then an honest moral accounting of the entire
situation must factor in the prospect that it not even be attempted!
A. The Leo Frank Case (and a Hypothetical Variation Posed by a
Participant)
The historical example of a real doomsday scenario noted by
Professors Hazard, Koniak, and Cramton in their legal ethics text was
the infamous case of Leo Frank,43 a case that occasioned both the
birth of the B'nai B'rith Anti-Defamation League and a resurgence
of the Ku Klux Klan.4' Frank was the Jewish manager of a pencil
factory in Atlanta, convicted and sentenced to death in 1913 for
In Schlup v. Delo, 115 S. Ct. 851 (1995), on the other hand, the petitioner was
claiming constitutional error in his trial, and used his claim of actual innocence largely as
the "gateway" to a review of the merits referred to above. The Supreme Court remanded
the case to the lower courts for further development of the facts, after a long discussion
of the ultimate burden that the petitioner must bear in demonstrating that the result of the
case might have been different if the constitutional errors had not been made.
Although there are important technical differences between Herrera and Schlup that
the Court referred to, id. at 861, it cannot be a coincidence that in the latter case there was
a much more realistic possibility that the convict really had been wrongly convicted. Id.
43. State v. Frank, 80 S.E. 1016 (Ga. 1914) [hereinafter Frank fj, affd, 237 U.S. 309
(1915) [hereinafter Frank H1].
44. Professor Kaufman had earlier recounted the same story in ANDREW L.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 214-15 (3d ed. 1989), in
connection with Problem 31, which is very much like the current Symposium problem.
Professor Kaufman asked students to consider whether any of the following factors should
influence the lawyer's behavior: the severity of the sentence imposed, the family situation
and past history of the wrong man in jail, the family situation and past history of the true
criminal, and whether the true criminal might offer some kind of defense or justification.
id.
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raping and murdering Mary Phagan, a thirteen year-old worker at the
factory.4' There was no physical evidence against Frank, and he was
convicted solely on the testimony of a janitor who claimed that Frank
had confessed to him and asked for help in disposing of the body.
46
The janitor, James Conley, had a long criminal record, and had
himself been detained briefly after he was seen washing a bloody
shirt.47
The trial was conducted in an atmosphere of intimidation, as
mobs on the courthouse lawn shouted to the jury to "hang the
Jew., 48 Indeed, the antisemitic hysteria was so great and so evident
that when the jury was about to deliver its verdict, the trial judge
advised the defendant and even his counsel to absent themselves from
the courtroom, for fear that they would both be lynched on the spot
if the jury either acquitted or failed to reach a verdict. 9
According to the autobiography of Arthur Gray Powell, a
prominent Georgia lawyer and judge of that period,"0 the trial judge
was convinced "to a mathematical certainty"" that Frank was
innocent, but he too was intimidated by the mob, and denied the
motion for a new trial only hours after telling Powell that the motion
was unassailable.52 After the conviction was affirmed by the Georgia
Supreme Court and habeas corpus relief denied in the United States
Supreme Court in 1915, Governor John Slaton commuted the
45. Frank 1, 80 S.E. at 1018.
46. Id at 1020.
47. Id
48. Georgia Pardons Victim 70 Years After Lynching, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1986, at
A16.
49. Frank II, 237 U.S. at 312. The Georgia courts rejected the claim that threatened
mob violence intimidated the jury as not factual. Id. at 311-16. The United States
Supreme Court refused to issue a writ of habeas corpus because the scope of the writ was
much more narrow than in later years, and the ability of the federal courts to re-adjudicate
factual determinations-even those concerning the "process" that had been provided-was
virtually nil. ld. at 345.
50. ARTHUR GREY POWELL, I CAN Go HOME AGAIN 287-92 (1943). Powell was
born in rural southwest Georgia in 1873, attended two years of college, and had no law
school experience. His apprenticeship as a lawyer began as early as age ten when he
began to help his father write writs for presentation to the local court.
In his autobiography, Powell unwittingly paints a picture of himself as a white
supremacist of the noblesse oblige tradition, hating lower class whites most of all for their
cruder and more violent forms of racism. But his own racism and elitism are so
unencumbered with affectation or regret that they give the ring of truth to the story that
he tells.
51. Id. at 288.
52. Id. at 288-89.
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sentence to lifeO Governor Slaton told some of his friends that he
failed to grant a full pardon only because he believed that the true
murderer would soon be unmasked, and that the mob that now
howled for Frank's blood would be demanding a pardon instead."
Whether or not that would have happened is unknown, but what
did happen is that ieveral attempts were made to storm the Gover-
nor's mansion and to lynch Governor Slaton-who mounted an armed
defense of the mansion along with his wife, a company of National
Guardsmen, and some well-connected friends, including Arthur
Powell.5 A few days later, Leo Frank was forcibly removed from
prison by vigilantes, and hanged from a tree near the victim's
home.1
6
The Frank case raises the issues presented in this Symposium,
because in addition to all of the above drama, it was a case in which
a lawyer knew that the wrong man was on death row, but did not or
could not take action. In his autobiography, Arthur Powell related
the story of Leo Frank almost as an aside,57 and then added a
further detail in a similarly understated -way. After the conviction was
affirmed, and shortly before the sentence was commuted and the
defendant then lynched, he learned the identity of the true murderer
from a would-be client. Powell does not state in his book whether the
would-be client was the murderer, or merely someone else who knew
the truth, although the implication is that it was the former. Nor does
he say if the true murderer was in fact the janitor, James Conley."
53. Id. at 289:
54. Id.
55. Id. at 290.
56. Id. at 291.
57. Despite his own significant and dramatic connection to the events in question, the
point of Powell's description of the Leo Frank case was mainly to illustrate his highly
implausible claim that Southerners of the early twentieth century were eager to lynch any
person thought guilty of rape, not just black persons. Id- at 277.
Equally improbable was his opening remark that the hysterical reaction to Leo Frank
was initially based on the fact that he was Mary Phagan's boss, not on the fact that he was
Jewish. Id. at 287. According to Powell, the open and pervasive antisemitism that
undeniably attended the trial and the subsequent violence was attributable to a backlash
against Jewish leaders and "civil rights societies" who fanned the flames by protesting that
Frank was a scapegoat. Id. at 287-88.
58. One other person knew the truth, and he did say that the true murderer was
Conley, but he did not say so for almost 70 years! Alonzo Mann was a young office boy
at the time of the crime, and he saw Conley carrying the body of Mary Phagan into the
basement where it was subsequently found. Wendell Rawls, Jr., After 69 Years of Silence,
Lynching Victim Is Cleared, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 8, 1982, at A12. Mann did not come
forward at the time because Conley threatened to kill him if he did. I&. Mann's mother
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All Powell says is that because of the oath of confidentiality, he could
not honorably reveal what he knew-even in 1943 when his autobiog-
raphy was published-until "after certain deaths occur.
5 9
In explaining the confidentiality principle to a lay audience, Judge
Powell quite properly blended in discussion of the closely related
evidentiary rule of attorney-client privilege. He reminded his readers
that if a lawyer became "so forgetful of his oath" as to attempt to
testify about the terrible facts in court-let us say in connection with
a motion for a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evi-
dence-it would be the obligation of the judge to refuse to hear it
anyway.' This does not answer whether there was anything else
that Powell could have done, assuming that he ought to have, but he
also reminded his readers that he only learned the truth after the
convictions had been affirmed. Furthermore, comments that the
Governor had made to Powell and some of their mutual friends
suggested that Slaton was already in possession of the same facts and
would soon follow the commutation with a full pardon.
Judge Powell's single understated paragraph about his continued
silence apparently drew considerable adverse commentary, for he
returned to the subject, somewhat defensively, a year later in a brief
also prevailed upon him to maintain silence, predicting (with tragic inaccuracy) that Leo
Frank would be found innocent anyway. Id.
In 1982, about 20 years after James Conley died, Mann gave an affidavit to the
Nashville newspaper The Tennessean, describing what he had seen in 1913. Ia Despite
this evidence, the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles initially denied a posthumous
pardon, on the ground that it was impossible after such a long time to prove or disprove
guilt or innocence. Georgia Pardons Victim 70 Years After Lynching, supra note 48, at
A16. After Alonzo Mann died in 1985, the case was presented again, and in 1986 the
Board granted a pardon on the basis that by failing to safeguard Leo Frank's life, the State
of Georgia had made it impossible for him to clear himself at a time when fresher
evidence was still available. Id.
59. POWELL, supra note 50, at 291-92. Assuming that Powell was correct that he
"could not" reveal the would-be client's confidence during the life of that person-or
perhaps that person's intimates-his further assumption, that death of the client would
extinguish the obligation, may not be sound. For a brief discussion of whether the duty
of confidentiality survives the death of the client, see 1 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W.
WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING § 1.6:101, at 130-130.1 (2d ed. & Supp. 1993).
It is much clearer that the evidentiary attorney-client privilege is not extinguished
upon the death of the client. This proposition was taken as given in the Macumber case.
See infra text accompanying note 122. For a fuller discussion of survival of both the
privilege and the ethical duty to maintain confidences, see Brian R. Hood, Comment, The
Attorney-Client Privilege and a Revised Rule 1.6: Permitting Limited Disclosure After the
Death of the Client, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 741 (1994).
60. That was a key point of State v. Macumber, 582 P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1978). See infra
notes 112-20 and accompanying text.
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essay in the Georgia Bar Journal.61 This time explicitly distinguish-
ing between the ethical rule of confidentiality and the legal rule of
privilege, he reiterated that disclosing the information in court would
not only subject him to disciplinary penalty, but would be ineffective,
because the court could not legally receive his testimony.62 Not
content to rest upon the fortuity of the timing of his discovery, he
insisted-correctly for his time and quite probably correctly even
today-that the situation would be the same even if he had known the
truth while the trial was still going on.63
Admitting that he would be "strongly tempted" to break the oath
in that situation, Powell did not budge on the illegality and the futility
of such a course of action. Tying the attorney-client privilege to the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel in criminal cases, he continued to
insist that evidence about what his would-be client had said would be
inadmissible.' 4
Judge Powell, however, continued to avoid discussion of other
steps that he could have taken if knowledge of the truth had come
earlier, such as informing the prosecutor, informing the state Attorney
General, or exerting pressure through a media campaign to exonerate
a defendant he knew was wrongly accused. Would such steps have
been effective? There are no guarantees, given the tenor of the
times. Yet, it is surely fair to say that specific information coming
from an establishment figure would not have been ignored entirely,
especially at a time when the prosecution had not yet committed all
of its resources and its prestige to the prosecution of Leo Frank, and
especially when James Conley would still have been under suspicion.
I will leave to the Symposium participants the question whether
a lawyer or other professional should make an exception to ordinary
professional norms in such changed circumstance, risking disbarment
61. Arthur G. Powell, Privilege of Counsel and Confidential Communications, 6 GA.
B.J. 333 (1944).
62. Id. at 333.
63. IM.
64. Id. at 334. It was much too early in the development of the law for Powell to
realize that there was a possible constitutional argument, also grounded in the Sixth
Amendment, in favor of allowing the testimony. As will be discussed in connection with
the Macumber case, courts today will at least consider the argument that if insisting upon
the inviolability of the privilege has the effect of hampering the defense, the Sixth
Amendment cuts the other way because it not only has an "Assistance of Counsel" Clause,
but also a "Compulsory Process" Clause. The Compulsory Process Clause has been
interpreted to include a fairly broad "right to present a defense." See infra note 127 and
accompanying text.
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or other professional censure as the price of civil disobedience. My
point is simply that changing the circumstances in such a fundamental
way changes the entire cast of that debate. In the real Leo Frank
case, ironically, the real Arthur Powell faced a diminished moral
dilemma at the time that he actually faced it because, in the precise
circumstances of the real case, virtually nothing more could be done.
The prosecution surely Would not consider reopening an enormously
popular death sentence after it had been won, and Governor Slaton
appeared to be aware of the truth already. In those circumstances, to
break the oath and disclose a client's awful secret would have been
little more than a self-indulgence to soothe Powell's conscience and
to flaunt his moral superiority.
B. The Twelve-Year Ordeal of Henry Drake
The case history of Henry Drake and William "Pop" Campbell
provides a dramatic contrast to the seeming inevitability of the Leo
Frank case-the real Leo Frank case, not the hypothetical version
discussed by Arthur Powell in the Georgia Bar Journal.65 In this
case, which dragged on for some twelve years, a "wrong man" sat on
death row, while at least one of the "right man's" lawyers could have
taken immediate action that almost certainly would have made a
difference.6
In December, 1975, a seventy-four-year-old barber was blud-
geoned to death with a claw hammer in his own barber shop in rural
Georgia.67 Drake and Campbell, who had met during an earlier
prison stay, were charged with the crime, and each implicated the
other.6
Campbell was tried first, and he testified in his own defense that
while he was having his hair cut, Drake came in without warning and
killed the barber, hitting Campbell once with the hammer when he
protested the attack.69 At Drake's trial, Campbell continued to
testify against Drake, although his story had been embellished
significantly for the occasion.7" Drake admitted that he had dropped
Campbell off at the barber shop and picked him up later, but
65. David Kaplan, Death Row Dilemma, NAT'L LJ., Jan. 25, 1988, at 35.
66. Id
67. IM
68. Id at 35-36.
69. Id. at 35.
70. Id. at 35-36.
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otherwise denied any prior knowledge or involvement in the
murder.71 He was forced to admit, however, that when he learned
from Campbell that Campbell had killed the old man, he had helped
him escape to Virginia the next day.! The juries did not believe
either defendant, both were convicted at their separate trials of first
degree murder, and both were sentenced to death.73
In private discussions with his lawyer, however, "Pop" Campbell,
nearing age sixty, consistently maintained that he alone was guilty,
and that he was implicating Drake only because he thought that the
younger man had informed on him and engineered his extradition
back to Georgia from Virginia.' In later discussions about the case,
Campbell's lawyer acknowledged that he knew of his client's factual
guilt before either of the trials began.' This means that he knew
that his client planned to-and did-commit perjury at his own trial,
and that Campbell's follow up perjury was the only reason that an
innocent man, Henry Drake, was sitting alongside him on death row.
The lawyer, however, later told a reporter that he was "bound by the
rules of confidentiality" and could not, in any event, prevent
Campbell from exercising his "right to testify., 76  His statement,
however, is incorrect; this is a case where-the lawyer could have made
a difference, and where, therefore, a more searching moral inquiry
71. Id at 35.
72. Id at 36.
73. Drake's conviction and death sentence were upheld in Drake v. State, 247 S.E.2d
57 (Ga. 1978).
74. Kaplan, supra note 65, at 36.
75. Id Because Campbell's story was both internally consistent and consistent with
what both Drake and his girlfriend had said, the lawyer could not resort to the evasion
that only jurors "know" what the truth is-and even then only after the case is completed.
Professor Monroe Freedman, justly famous for his uncompromising defense of both
zealous advocacy and the confidentiality principle, has often branded the claim that
lawyers cannot "know" the truth as both sophistic and morally irresponsible. See, eg.,
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHics IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 51-57 (1975).
Professor Alan Dershowitz, also a well-known defender of the adversary system, has
similarly noted that most criminal defendants are factually guilty, and that their lawyers
know it. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 41, at 117.
Since Campbell told his lawyer the truth, the lawyer also could not avail himself of
the subsidiary myth that lawyers never know the truth unless their clients tell them about
it, no matter how overwhelming the evidence. This self-serving proposition-if it were val-
id-would permit lawyers always to escape moral responsibility for knowledge simply by
instructing their clients never to tell them the truth. Although this particular myth has
been debunked often, it dies hard, and was employed by many of OJ. Simpson's criminal
defense lawyers to maintain the pretense that they did not "know" of their client's factual
guilt.
76. Kaplan, supra note 65, at 36.
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about what he ought to have done is appropriate.
Certainly at Campbell's own trial, where the lawyer was called
upon actually to present and argue false evidence,"7 the lawyer could
have-and should have-refused and demanded that his client testify
truthfully or not at all. Since in the Campbell case there was
essentially no truthful evidence that the defendant could give, this
would have meant keeping the defendant off the stand, which is the
usual practice anyway, especially when the defendant has a prior
criminal record.
Pop Campbell's lawyer might well respond-perhaps contemptu-
ously-that this is merely academic hindsight, disconnected from the
"real world" of zealous advocacy. After all-the argument might
run-it was only some ten years later that the United States Supreme
Court ruled that while a criminal defendant has a constitutional right
to testify on his own behalf, he has no right to testify falsely, and that
he therefore has no Sixth Amendment right to a lawyer who will aid
and abet him in doing so.78 But that would also be incorrect, despite
the correct invocation of Nix v. Whiteside.79
At the time of the Campbell trial in 1976, courts at every level
had universally rejected the notion that a lawyer may knowingly assist
a client in presenting perjured testimony. To be sure, even today
there is not general agreement on exactly what a lawyer caught in this
situation must do, and the Supreme Court neither provided an answer
in Whiteside, nor had jurisdiction to do so.80 But there was-even
in 1976-general agreement about what lawyers must not do, namely
to sit idly by, prisoners and pawns of their own clients, as Pop Camp-
77. The situation may have been slightly different at Drake's trial because Campbell's
evidence would have been presented by the prosecutor, not Campbell's lawyer, and the
prosecutor did not know that the testimony was false. Still, if Campbell's lawyer had seen
to it that the false story was not presented during Campbell's trial, the prosecutor would
not have presented it, even innocently, during Drake's trial.
78. The Supreme Court did not explicitly hold that there is a constitutional right of
a criminal defendant to testify on his or her own behalf until Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S.
44 (1987). A year earlier, in Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. 157 (1986), discussed immediately
below in the text, the Court dealt with the client perjury issue only after assuming the
existence of a basic right to testify. Id. at 164.
79. 475 U.S. 157 (1986).
80. As pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Brennan, the Supreme Court
had jurisdiction only to decide whether or not Mr. Whiteside's conviction was in
derogation of his Sixth Amendment rights, because of what his lawyers had actually done.
Il at 176-77 (Brennan, J., concurring). The Supreme Court has no authority to dictate
to the states how to arrange their criminal justice systems, so long as they meet the
minimum requirements of the Federal Constitution. Id. at 177 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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bell's lawyer blandly and self-righteously assumed was required.
Indeed, it is worthwhile to remember that the Whiteside trial
took place in Iowa only about a year after the Campbell trial took
place in Georgia, also long before the Supreme Court had spoken.
Yet, the lawyers in Whiteside made exactly the opposite assumption
from Campbell's first lawyer; they took as a given that they were
required to do something to avoid actively presenting perjured
testimony, and that neither the confidentiality principle nor the
defendant's "right to testify" was sufficient to trump their obligation
to the system and to the court.8 They demanded that their client
testify truthfully, on pain of disclosure to the court, and the Iowa
Supreme Court later commended them "for the high ethical manner
in which this matter was handled;"' and of course, the United States
Supreme Court held that they had not denied their client his Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel, as just noted.'
As described so far, Henry Drake's case fits the basic paradigm
under discussion: The wrong man is on death row, and the right
man's lawyer knows about it. The story is worse than other real and
fictional examples-such as the Leo Frank case-because the lawyer
knew about the client's perjured testimony before it was given, and
even made it more likely to happen because of his unethical failure
to intervene in some way.' But Henry Drake's story gets even
worse because the lawyer who took over Pop Campbell's case on
appeal actively worked to keep Drake on death row, even though he
also knew the truth, and even though his client wanted to right the
wrong.
As if to prefigure the third part of the Symposium problem,
Campbell's change of heart came through the intervention of a
religious counselor, a local pastor who also ran a death row lay
ministry.8" Campbell confessed to her the very first time she visited
him, and she recognized that she had a confidentiality problem of her
81. This is hardly surprising, since Disciplinary Rule 7-102(A)(4) of the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, in effect in both Iowa and Georgia at the times in question,
flatly stated that a lawyer shall not "[k]nowingly use perjured testimony or false evidence."
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1986).
82. State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 471 (Iowa 1978).
83. Nix v. Whiteside, 475 U.S. at 158.
84. I reiterate that it was not then-and still is not now-absolutely clear what a
lawyer ought to do in such situations. The only thing that is now-and was then-clear
is that lawyers may not do what Campbell's lawyer did do.
85. Kaplan, supra note 65, at 36.
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own. 6 This problem disappeared, however, when, over the course
of a few months, she convinced Campbell to come forward with the
truth as a matter of conscience.' But when the pastor sought the
help of Campbell's new lawyer, he said that there was nothing he
could do and repeatedly warned his client not to recant and not to
talk to anyone about the case!8"
The lawyer was in the midst of trying to have the death sentence
set aside, and he rightly feared that a recantation would torpedo that
effort, as well as expose Campbell to a perjury charge.89 But his
client, a fully competent and autonomous adult, was aware of these
possibilities and had made a choice that righting the wrong done to
Henry Drake was more important.' His determination became
stronger as his health deteriorated, for he feared most of all being
executed or dying in prison with no assurance that Drake would be
freed.91 Nonetheless, the most that the paternalistic lawyer would
"allow" the client to do was to prepare an affidavit-to be used in the
event of Campbell's death. 2
This appeased Campbell for almost a year, but in April of 1981
his religious counselors helped him prepare another affidavit to give
directly to Drake's lawyers.93 Drake had by now been in prison for
over five years and on death row for four, but Campbell's lawyer still
put pressure on him to recant his recantation.94 This was to no avail,
and this chapter of the story ended with the filing of a motion for a
new trial for Drake and a hearing at which Campbell testified fully
about his own solo role in the murder.95
But the closing of one chapter only signaled the opening of
another. As discussed earlier, courts and prosecutors rarely look with
an unjaundiced eye at such late recantations, and this case was no
86. Id
87. Id.
88. Id Strong advocates of teaching legal ethics in a clinical setting, Professors David
Luban and Michael Millemann, see supra note 13, would no doubt be disturbed to learn
that the new lawyer was a staff lawyer at the University of Georgia School of Law
Prisoner Project Clinic. Kaplan, supra note 65, at 36. Unfortunately, there is no guarantee
that clinical teachers will always model either good judgment or ethical lawyering.
89. Id.
90. Id
91. Id
92. Id-
93. Id
94. Id
95. Id
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exception. Despite the facts that Drake's conviction and death
sentence rested almost exclusively on Campbell's original testimony
and that several people were prepared to testify that Campbell's
recantation was not of recent origin, the trial court denied relief, and
this ruling was affirmed in February of 1982 by the Georgia Supreme
Court.96 Indeed, a majority of the justices used the occasion of the
Drake case to confirm that the law was "settled" in Georgia that
recantation of a government witness is not grounds for a new trial,
even if the recantation is believed.97
Pop Campbell died in prison in 1983, and Henry Drake remained
on death row.98 After another two years, his original conviction was
overturned by the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit on petition for habeas corpus relief.99 The chief reason given
was that the trial judge's instructions may have misled the jury into
thinking that the defendant bore the burden of proof on the issue of
intent."° The Eleventh Circuit was aware of Campbell's recanta-
tion, but did not address it, given its decision to grant relief to Drake
on other grounds.
Henry Drake was retried in January of 1987, just over eleven
years after the crime."' With the Campbell affidavit center stage,
the jury nonetheless hung ten-to-two in favor of acquittal."°
Another trial was held in April of the same year, and this time Drake
was convicted and sentenced to life in prison.0 3 In the meantime,
Drake's cause had been taken up by an unlikely champion, a former
police officer who sat on the Georgia Board of Pardons and Pa-
roles.1 " Eight months after his second conviction, and almost
96. Drake v. State, 28 S.E.2d 180 (Ga. 1982), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1111 (1982).
97. Id at 182. To be sure, some of the justices hedged their bets by casting some
doubts upon the credibility of the recanted story. The murdered man, although 70 years
old, was in good physical condition, whereas Pop Campbell suffered from severe asthma
and emphysema, and might not have been up to a prolonged fight. Id. at 181.
Furthermore, a knife belonging to Drake had been found at the scene of the crime, and
his claim that he had earlier given it to Campbell might not be believed. Id.
98. Kaplan, supra note 65, at 37.
99. Drake v. Kemp, 762 F.2d 1449 (11th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
100. Id. at 1453. Shifting the burden of proof away from the prosecution is
impermissible under Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979). An instruction virtually
identical to the one employed by the trial court was found impermissible in Francis v.
Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 (1985).
101. Kaplan, supra note 65, at 37.
102. Id
103. Id
104. Id
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exactly twelve years after his initial arrest, Henry Drake was paroled,
with the promise of later consideration of a full pardon. 5
For purposes of this Introduction, the lesson of Henry Drake's
ordeal is that while both lawyers representing Pop Campbell acted
unprofessionally and unethically, their misconduct affected the "wrong
man on death row" in dramatically different ways. But for the trial
lawyer's misconduct, there is some significant chance that Henry
Drake might have been kept off death row and out of prison
altogether. Ironically, however, even though Campbell's appellate
lawyer persistently refused to carry out his client's wishes, there may
not have been a great deal that he could have done to alleviate
Drake's situation, even if he thought that he should have. The
subsequent history shows that even after Campbell "disobeyed" his
lawyer and formally recanted, another eight years passed before
Drake was freed-not by action of the judicial system, but in spite of
it.
It is of course possible that Campbell's recantation might have
been more effective if he had been alive to deliver it in person to the
second jury, rather than through affidavits. The second jury, after all,
came two votes shy of acquitting Drake as it was. And it is even
possible that immediate action by Campbell's second lawyer could
have dissuaded the prosecutor from mounting a second and then a
third trial. Given the vigor of the later prosecutions and the
bitterness with which the action of the Board of Pardons and Paroles
was opposed and then denounced, however, these seem unlikely.
Thus, although Pop Campbell's second lawyer was plainly guilty
of disloyalty to his own client, what he could have done or ought to
have done with respect to Henry Drake remains murky. The question
has become whether the inability to influence events very much
morally absolves the second lawyer from even trying, which is of
course the nagging question that I posed in the title to this Introduc-
tion, and the question that I hope readers will take to all of the
Symposium articles.
C. State v. Macumber, the American Law Institute, and the Need
to Consider Context
An Arizona double homicide case, State v. Macumber,
1°6
105. Id
106. State v. Macumber, 544 P.2d 1084 (Ariz. 1976) (reversing conviction and
remanding for new trial) [hereinafter Macumber ]; State v. Macumber, 582 P.2d 162
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involved a less dramatic version of the "wrong person in prison"
doomsday scenario, yet it also illustrates most sharply the relationship
between what ought and what can be done in such situations. The
case is thus a fitting one to conclude this Introduction, for it demon-
strates the superiority of an approach that takes account of the rich
detail of real life drama over any attempt to "solve" doomsday
scenarios with dogmatic pronouncements in the abstract. It is
bootless, the Macumber case teaches us, to moralize in high dudgeon
about the immorality of remaining silent, if a clear-eyed analysis of
reality demonstrates that speaking out will not improve the situation.
In the spring of 1962, a young couple was found murdered in the
desert not far from downtown Phoenix."°  Despite an extensive
investigation, no substantial leads were developed, and the case lay
dormant for a dozen years." In 1974, however, William Macumber
came under suspicion after his estranged wife reported to the police
that he had confessed to her.39 Macumber admitted that he had
made such statements to his wife, but denied that they were true."0
With a specific suspect now identified, the authorities soon developed
substantial physical evidence of Macumber's guilt, and he was tried
and convicted of two counts of first degree murder and sentenced to
life in prison."'
Long before Mrs. Macumber precipitated the reopening of the
double-murder case, Ernest Valenzuela was charged with an unrelated
murder that had taken place in roughly the same locale.12 During
consultations with his defense attorneys in 1968, Valenzuela confided
that he had killed the young couple as well." He subsequently
died, and when his attorneys learned in 1974 that Macumber was to
(1978) (affirming conviction after second trial) [hereinafter Macumber 1].
107. Macumber II, 582 P.2d at 164.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. The main defense was that Mrs. Macumber had connived with police to frame
the defendant by helping them plant evidence. Id. at 164-65. Although direct evidence
of such a conspiracy was lacking, it was not wholly bizarre, given that Mrs. Macumber had
been active in a volunteer search and rescue unit associated with the sheriff's office, had
had training in crime scene investigation techniques, had worked in the sheriff's office as
a clerk, and had permanently moved out of the marital abode only a few weeks before
making her revelations about Mr. Macumber's confession. Id. at 164.
112. Macumber , 544 P.2d at 1087 (Holohan, J., concurring) (Ernest Valenzuela was
not identified in Macumber I but his name was later revealed in Macumber II, 582 P.2d
at 166.).
113. I. (Holohan, J., concurring).
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be tried for the murders that their former client had confessed to
committing, they decided that they ought to take action."4
The State Bar Committee on Ethics furnished them with an
informal opinion stating that it would not be improper to disclose
what they knew." 5  Accordingly, the lawyers informed both the
defense and the prosecution in the Macumber case of their knowl-
edge, and were prepared to testify under oath about the confes-
sion."6 The trial judge, however, rejected the proffered testimony
sua sponte, on the ground that it was barred by the attorney-client
privilege-which he ruled survived the death of the client."7
On appeal to the Arizona Supreme Court, the Macumber
convictions were unanimously reversed and the case remanded for a
new trial because the trial court had erroneously excluded the
testimony of a defense ballistics expert."' Since there was to be a
second trial, the court pressed on to review the ruling on the attorney-
client privilege, which would inevitably figure in further proceed-
ings."
9
The majority opinion upheld the sanctity of the privilege, treating
the matter as one of relatively simple hornbook law. First, a statute
established the basic attorney-client privilege."W Second, although
the privilege belongs to the client and may be waived by the client, a
third party-including the court on its own motion-may assert the
114. Id. (Holohan, J., concurring).
115. Id. (Holohan, J., concurring). As later described by the Arizona Supreme Court,
this ethics opinion dealt with "the privilege of attorney-client," id. (Holohan, J.,
concurring), although it is more likely that it actually dealt with the confidentiality
principle embodied in Canon 4 of the then-applicable Model Code of Professional
Responsibility. Typically, ethics committees disclaim any authority over-or even expertise
in-matters of law or legal interpretation, and the scope of the attorney-client privilege is
plainly a matter of evidence law, not professional ethics.
With respect to the professional ethics issue, it is not known whether the Committee
thought that the ordinary prohibition on disclosure did not apply because the client was
deceased, or because the potential harm to Macumber was sufficiently grave to trigger an
"exception." If an exception did apply, it could only have been an informal or ad hoc
exception for the one arguably applicable exception to MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101(C) (1980), the so-called "required by law" exception, could not
actually apply, because no law, court order, or subpoena "required" the lawyers to do
anything.
116. Macumber 1, 544 P.2d at 1086.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 1087.
119. Id. at 1086.
120. Id.
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privilege on the client's behalf in the absence of the client.'' Third,
the privilege does not terminate with the death of the client, except
in situations-such as a will contest-where it is assumed that
disclosure would be or would have been in the client's interest.'2
Although excluding potentially powerful evidence of exculpation is
harsh, the legislature presumably took into account such a possibility
when it established the privilege in the first place, but found the
policies favoring an essentially absolute privilege more compelling.'23
Two of the five justices disagreed with this view. Their main
argument was that the United States Supreme Court had recently held
that states were prohibited from employing ordinary evidence rules to
hamper the defense in the presentation of its case. 4  Thus, while
the Assistance of Counsel Clause of the Sixth Amendmenti' would
almost certainly prevent the prosecution from making use of
statements the defendant made to his or her lawyer,'26 where the
defendant wishes to introduce exculpatory evidence coming from
someone else's lawyer, barring it runs afoul of the Compulsory Process
Clause of the Sixth Amendment,'27 as well as the more general due
process right to a fair trial.
The concurring justices in Macumber were willing to concede that
the privilege serves important societal purposes, and that it probably
121. Il
122. Id.
123. it
124. Id. at 1088 (Holohan, J., concurring).
125. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
126. Introduction of such statements would not violate the defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights even if they were incriminating, and even if the lawyer was compelled
to reproduce them by subpoena or otherwise. Since the client would have made the
original statements voluntarily, there is no compulsion against the one who might be
incriminated.
127. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. The Compulsory Process Clause states that "the accused
shall enjoy the right.., to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor."
Id. The key case was Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973), in which the Supreme
Court held that a refusal to recognize the "statement against penal interest" exception to
the hearsay rule was unconstitutional if it barred the testimony of a defense witness. Id.
at 302. This holding was reaffirmed a few years after the Macumber case, in Green v.
Georgia, 442 U.S. 95 (1979), even though the hearsay statements did not have the same
indicia of reliability as those in Chambers. Id. at 97. According to the Supreme Court,
the point of the compulsory process clause is to require that exculpatory evidence be put
before the jury. Id. The defendant, in other words, must be allowed to "present a
defense." The jury will, of course, still decide for itself whether to believe or disbelieve
the evidence.
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survived the death of Valenzuela.28 Given the death of the client,
however, the strength of the privilege must be seen as diminished, for
at a minimum the "right person" could no longer be prosecuted and
substituted for the "wrong person" in jail.129  Characterizing the
attorney-client privilege after the death of the client as no more than
a "property interest of the deceased client," the dissenting justices
would have held it outweighed by the nascent constitutional right of
the defendant "to present a defense."'130
As the second trial began, State v. Macumber thus appeared to
present a classic variation of the Symposium problem: the wrong
person is in jail and the right person's lawyers know it. But right
from the start, Macumber was less dramatic of a "doomsday scenario"
than some of the others. For one thing, no death penalty was
involved. For another, the informal opinion of the Ethics Committee
had removed much of the emotional stress: the problem had become
a technical duel over evidence law rather than an excruciating moral
or ethical quandary. Thirdly, given the Arizona Supreme Court's
explicit ruling, there seemed little that could be done since the
lawyers were not going to be allowed to testify, and the prosecutors
seemed quite confident that they had the right man, even knowing of
Valenzuela's confession to his lawyers.
Perhaps most telling of all was that the strong indicia in the Leo
Frank and Henry Drake cases that the "wrong man" really was the
wrong man were missing. While there was nothing to indicate that
the lawyers were insincere in their report of the "right person's"
confession, the circumstances under which he gave his state-
ment-including a delay of some six years-did not inspire the same
degree of confidence as in other cases.
In this posture, the Macumber variation on the Symposium
128. Macumber I, 544 P.2d at 1088 (Holohan, J., concurring).
129. Id. (Holohan, J., concurring).
130. Id. (Holohan, J., concurring); see Steven G. Churchwell, The Constitutional Right
to Present Evidence: Progeny of Chambers v. Mississippi, 19 CRIM. L. BULL. 131, 131
(1983); Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An Emergent Constitutional
Guarantee Right in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 713, 713 (1976).
Book length treatment of the subject may be found in EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED,
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE (1990), the annual supplement to which was prepared for
several years by Professor David Leonard of Loyola Law School of Los Angeles.
According to § 10-5(a) of the treatise, courts today generally reject a balance that favors
displacement of the attorney-client privilege, but more and more are expressing willingness
at least to engage in such a balance, and to concede that in the proper case, the "right to
present a defense" might prevail. Id. § 10-5(a).
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problem provoked a spirited-but almost comically off-point--debate
in the American Law Institute (ALI). The ALI has been in the
process of drafting a Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers for
a number of years, and at its 66th Annual Meeting in Philadelphia in
1989, it debated proposed section 132, a provision dealing with the
crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege. The reporter,
Professor Charles Wolfram of Cornell Law School, had included a
proposed Illustration 4, which was based on the facts of the first
Macumber case, except that the client who confessed to his lawyers
was still alive. The point of Illustration 4 was that since the client's
communication to the lawyer concerned a past crime, the crime-fraud
exception would not apply, the attorney-client privilege would apply,
and the evidence would be inadmissible.'
A number of ALI members indignantly demanded deletion of
Illustration 4-but without objecting to the proposed text of section
132, which was a routine statement of when the privilege would not
apply. Obviously confusing the ethical rule of confidentiality with the
legal rule of evidence, they further muddied the waters by insisting
that it would be immoral for a lawyer not to come forward to "do the
right thing" and correct such a wrong. A lawyer with the courage to
engage in civil disobedience in this instance should be praised, not
condemned, they said, "daring" any disciplinary authority to impose
punishment.
This, of course, missed the point of Macumber entirely for the
State Bar Committee on Ethics had already given the lawyers advance
permission to "violate" the ethical rule of confidentiality, and the
lawyers had already attempted to do what the ALI critics assumed
was "the right thing." But even if it is clear what is right in this
situation-a subject on which the Symposium authors will dis-
agree-there is still the brute problem that the rules of evidence as
laid down by the Arizona Supreme Court appeared to prevent the
131. Arthur Gray Powell had made the same point in discussing his own dilemma in
the Leo Frank case. State v. Frank, 80 S.E. 1016 (Ga. 1914), aff'd, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
In his brief essay in the Georgia Bar Journal, he reminded readers that although he did
not hear the confession of the true murderer until after the trial was over, the legal rule
of evidence would be the same even if he had learned the truth before the trial began.
Powell, supra note 61, at 333.
At the time of the Leo Frank case, of course, no argument could have been made that
the defendant's right to present a defense trumped the evidentiary privilege. It is curious,
however, that no participant in the ALl debate voiced the thought that perhaps the
Macumber result was unconstitutional rather than immoral. See supra notes 127-30 and
accompanying text.
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lawyers from doing anything further. That was the point of Illustra-
tion 4, and also of this Introduction.
The debate in the ALI ended with a plea by Professor Roger
Cramton for a more nuanced approach to the evidentiary rule itself.
He too found the illustrative case "revolting," as it stood, but added
that it was revolting in part "because it states a stark, moral quandary,
without any richness or depth, without the certainty of the lawyer's
knowledge of the client's guilt, without other information about the
client or consequences to the client of the lawyer's action.""3
As far as the transcript of the ALI proceedings reveals, the
participants in the debate were not aware that the real Macumber
case did provide considerably more richness in the second trial and
subsequent appeal than was apparent in the stark all-or-nothing duel
over the privilege in the first appeal. The denouement of the
Macumber case will allow me to segue to some concluding observa-
tions about the richness and detail deliberately built in to the Sym-
posium problem.
At the close of the State's case in the second Macumber trial, the
defense again proffered evidence of Valenzuela's confession to his
lawyers.133 Furthermore, in a second proffer of special significance
to this Symposium, the defense also offered to show that Valenzuela
had repeated his confession to a psychiatrist and that when he
confessed a third time to another lawyer, that a different psychiatrist
was present, having just administered the "truth serum" sodium
pentothal.'" Showing remarkable independence, the trial judge
ruled that the privilege issues were not foreclosed by the Arizona
Supreme Court's first opinion, precisely because the issue had been
presented in the barren format of a formal offer of proof, without any
factual backdrop.35
When the trial judge heard the evidence about Ernest
Valenzuela's several "confessions," however, it was at once apparent
that they were so utterly lacking in reliability that they ought not to
be admitted in the face of the important policies underlying both the
attorney-client and the doctor-patient privileges.1 36  None of the
132. It will be recalled that Professor Cramton, along with co-authors Hazard and
Koniak, took the same approach in their legal ethics text. See supra notes 34-35 and
accompanying text.
133. Macumber II, 582 P.2d at 165.
134. Id. at 166-67.
135. Id. at 166.
136. Id. at 166-67.
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professionals had a firm recollection of what Valenzuela had said, and
what they did remember him saying did not square with the known
facts of the case. 7  William Macumber was convicted of both
murders again, and his convictions were upheld by the Arizona
Supreme Court, this time unanimously.1
8
Quoting from the concurring opinion in the first case, the
Arizona Supreme Court in effect adopted that view that although the
emerging constitutional right "to present a defense" does sometimes
require the admission of defense evidence that would not be admissi-
ble if offered by the prosecution, the evidence still must satisfy a
threshold requirement of trustworthiness.'39 While criminal defen-
dants would prefer a regime in which they can present whatever
evidence they like, leaving the prosecution with only the hope that the
jurors will weed out patently absurd testimony, that is not the
law-including constitutional law."4
In retrospect, then, the Macumber cases teach mainly the
importance of context, because only attention to context allows us to
make sound judgments about what the lawyers could and should have
done, and whether the rulings of the courts were sensible.
If the case is presented in a stark-and ultimately false-light, as
one in which a stick figure "right person" has confessed to stick figure
lawyers that a stick figure "wrong person" stands convicted of a
serious crime, it is easy to be outraged at a callous legal system that
will turn its back by citing a technical rule of evidence or procedure.
That is where some ALI members went wrong. But if the case is
understood as one in which the person "confessing" is a complex
character who is just blowing smoke to impress his lawyers, and the
lawyers are merely trying to see that every "i" is properly dotted and
every "t" crossed, then it is just as easy to accept the final outcome.
With the stakes so high, it was reasonable to slow the system
down long enough to consider the possibility that Ernest Valenzuela
was the "right man," not William Macumber. But although it is still
possible that Macumber was the wrong man wrongly convicted after
all, at least we now know with a high degree of certainty that the
identity of the right man is not known, and that the lawyers of the
right man are not sitting on confidential or privileged information in
137. Id.
138. Id. at 170.
139. Id. at 167.
140. See IMWINKELRIED, supra note 130, § 14-1.
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a moral quandary about what they ought to do with it, or whether
there is anything that they can do with it.
V. CONCLUSION: MAKING JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE SYMPOSIUM
PROBLEM IN CONTEXT
The editors of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review have
presented the Symposium participants and their readers with a
variation of the basic dilemma that is rich in realistic detail. This is
no accident. Each nuance was built into the problem as a potential
hook for the authors to hang their hats on, a potential platform upon
which they might develop further variations or inquiries. And the
plan worked; the editors reaped what they sowed! Whether the
contributions are read with intense care or scanned, in the order
presented or randomly, a reader cannot help but be struck by how
many of the authors were indeed provoked to tailor their responses
to the precise facts of the Symposium Problem as given.
Some noted how young Claire Hopewell is, and how manipula-
tive Ben Jones is. Many commented on the desperately short time
span available for any action, and the consequent need for developing
both immediate and longer-term strategies. Some took into account
the practical difficulties that I have stressed throughout this Introduc-
tion: Frank Smith is not going to be released or spared merely upon
the say-so of a lawyer or a clergyman or a psychiatrist, and certainly
not without the cooperation of Ben Jones.
Not surprisingly, the most attention was lavished upon the
character of Ben Jones himself. He is a life-long convict who has
killed in cold blood, yet he has some flicker of a conscience that
brands Frank Smith's impending death as "not right." He is self-
centered and calculating, and unwilling to do the right thing without
a return on his "investment," but he does not foreclose entirely the
use of his name-"not yet," he says. Ben Jones has not attended
religious services for years, yet he returns "home" to his old house of
worship in a time of crisis-weeping. He could easily skip his therapy
sessions, now that he is no longer under restraint, and he could easily
lie to Dr. Palmer, but he does neither. Why any of these? Why all
of these? Why now?
If you pose a stick figure hypothetical to professional commenta-
tors, you will obtain responses that are both unsubtle and uninterest-
ing. Indeed, it might even be said that the responses will be
"unprofessional," because the point of being a professional is to
provide others with the benefits of your wisdom, and it is next to
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impossible to say wise things about stick figures. The hypothetical
given to the Symposium participants, however, did not confine them
in this manner, and instead allowed full scope for their creativity.
I thus end where I started-joining Anthony Kronman in insisting
that judgment and prudence are the key building blocks of profession-
al experience. The Symposium authors-lawyers, clergymen, and
psychotherapists-are professionals all, and have given selflessly of
their wisdom. I invite readers to join them in a multi-disciplined
inquiry into a most perplexing problem.
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